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INTRODUCTION
“We had to watch the weather to keep us up-to-date.
Harvey was slowly getting closer. All we could do was wait.
The rain finally started falling. Huge waves began to crash.
The coast of Texas was hit first, and then we were in its path.”
- Landon Hayek, “They Called Him Harvey”
The Aftermath
While I read Landon Hayek’s poetry book on Hurricane Harvey, I was reminded of the
traumas that were experienced across not only the city of Houston but along the entire Texas
Gulf Coast in the summer of 2017. Though he was only nine years old when he wrote “They
Called Him Harvey,” Landon’s poem accurately portrays the emotions felt by millions before
Harvey hit. His illustrated book maintains a cheerful tone, and the proceeds from the book
benefit those affected by Hurricane Harvey. Still, sadness fell over me while I read, and my eyes
watered.
The following summer was dominated by a feeling of angst. I was back home in Houston
and was free from the responsibilities of college, but I could not overcome the fact that
Hurricane Harvey was the third “500-year” flood in a span of three years. The National Weather
Service assured us that “there [was] a 0.2 percent chance of having a flood of that magnitude
[occur]” in any given year, yet we were seeing these disasters occur annually.1 To some extent,
we could not trust the claims and suggestions made by experts and leaders because they had
failed us before (i.e. the catastrophic failure to evacuate Houston when Hurricane Rita hit and the
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US Department of Commerce, NOAA. “Flooding FAQ.” Accessed September 29, 2018.
https://www.weather.gov/lot/floodingfaq.

1

failure to evacuate Houston when Harvey hit).2 Taking matters into our own hands, my family
and I made a habit of carefully traversing the streets of Houston following a major flood. We
were told by police to avoid walking on the streets since flooded potholes and sewer drains were
invisible under the murky water. More drastic still were the unexpected changes in elevation
throughout the city’s unorganized sprawl, which easily swept cars away in deeper waters. Even
truck drivers were found perched on top of their enormous eighteen-wheelers as they waited for
a boat or helicopter to save them from the flooded highways (Figure 1). Stories like these
became commonplace. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reported over
6,500 highway water rescues and close to 122,331 people were rescued by local, state and
federal first responders. Clearly, Houston and its inhabitants were dangerously unprepared for
the “more than 19 trillion gallons of rainwater” that would inundate one-third of the city.3

FIGURE 1: INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 45 APPEARS SUBMERGED BY OVER 34 INCHES OF RAIN BROUGHT FORTH BY
HURRICANE HARVEY ON AUGUST 27, 2017. RICHARD CARSON / REUTERS
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Levin, Matt, “How Hurricane Rita Anxiety Led to the Worst Gridlock in Houston History - Houston Chronicle,”
Houston Chronicle, August 25, 2017, https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/HurricaneRita-anxiety-leads-to-hellish-fatal-6521994.php.
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FEMA, “Historic Disaster Response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas | FEMA.Gov,” September 22, 2017,
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2017/09/22/historic-disaster-response-hurricane-harvey-texas.
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Hurricane Harvey undoubtedly scarred me, but the intensity of the experience is not what
led me to write this thesis. For your average Houstonian, rain and occasional flooding is part of
living in the Bayou City, especially during the wet summer seasons. There is no way around the
fact that Houston’s humid subtropical climate attracts, on average, 50 inches of rain annually.4
The very same amount of rain that bombarded Houston over the span of just three days during
Harvey. Still, I decided to return home in the summer of 2018. My experiences that summer
would ultimately lay the foundation for this thesis, for the Houston that welcomed me that
summer donned the scars of the previous year. Empty plots of land were a grim reminder of the
families that lost their homes, and the sudden spike in new construction and housing units hinted
at a city desperately trying to rebuild. As homeowners throughout the region rebuilt their
properties, displaced people also sought to rebuild their lives. Some moved away after deciding
that the uncertainties of living in a place like Houston are too great to risk, but they were the
minority. Because of Hurricane Harvey, over 42,000 Texans were housed in temporary shelters
after nearly “80,000 homes [were flooded by] at least 18 inches of floodwater.” Of those homes,
23,000 were inundated with more than 5 feet of floodwater.5 Fortunately, FEMA and flood
insurance companies allowed a portion of the affected population to return to their damp and
damaged homes after conducting preliminary quality assessments. Some people have not
experienced that luxury, and now over 500 individuals live in tents under polluted highways.6
Homelessness in Houston, like in any other American metropolis, has always been
present. I have had personal encounters with homeless individuals in my neighborhood since I
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rss Weather, “Climate in Houston, Texas,” accessed November 16, 2018,
http://www.rssweather.com/climate/Texas/Houston/.
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FEMA, “Historic Disaster Response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas”
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was young, and I helped lead my school’s chapter of Habitat for Humanity. Still, this postHarvey wave of homelessness felt different. A simple explanation for this increase would be that
homes were damaged beyond repair, forcing those without any form of savings or aid to take
their chances on the streets. This explanation is unsatisfactory and problematic because it
diminishes the fault held by the institutions and systems put in place to protect us. The fact that
lower-class and minority groups were disproportionately affected by Hurricane Harvey remains a
strategically well-hidden reality, but this thesis aims to bring these realities to light. Through an
exploration of Houston’s history as the energy capital of the U.S. and once one of the harshest
Jim Crow cities in the country, I unravel the links between climate change, hurricanes, unequal
housing practices, and homelessness. I argue that hurricanes have a disproportionately larger
impact on minority groups, especially the lower class, and that their effects are largely rooted in
racial inequalities and class divides. Only by recognizing these dynamics can we ever hope to
rebuild and move forward, and as we have seen, little stands in the way of us and the next
historic flood.

Houston’s Flood History

Increasing floods over the past decade are worthy of attention, but these are not isolated
events or novel threats. Houston’s general disregard of urbanization and development, which
plays a role in the city’s inability to handle heavy rainfall, has been a key feature of its history. In
fact, floods, storms and the subtropical humid climate were actors in how Houston would
initially develop. Early settlers and travelers showed a general distaste for the climate and
aesthetic of the region. Frederick Law Olmsted, a popular American landscape architect who
traveled through Houston in the 1850s, boldly remarked that Houston “is not a spot in which I
4

should prefer to come to light, burn, and expire; in fact, if the nether region…be a boggy
country, the Avernal entrance might, I should think, with good possibilities, be looked for in this
region.”7 Born and raised in Houston, I can attest to the accuracy of Olmsted’s claims--though
the introduction of air-conditioning has surely helped.
Prior to the rise of oil in the late-1800s as the dominant energy source, Houston and the
Gulf Coast region were not promising locations for a thriving city. Heavy rainfall often flooded
entire marshlands and made areas near regional rivers, streams, and bayous impassable.
Furthermore, threats of hurricanes in the region “loomed for six months a year, from June to
November, and the same months brought oppressive, debilitating heat and humidity.” For these
reasons, Houston would remain sparsely populated until the turn of the 20th century. Until then,
Houston would be an “island of urban opportunity in a sea of rural poverty.”8 Cotton plantations
along the Brazos River would uphold the region’s economy until the 1900s, which of course
meant a prevalence of slavery, peonage, and racial segregation. Clearly unfit for human
settlement, Houston’s climate brought forth yellow fever and malaria epidemics by providing
ideal conditions for mosquito vectors to procreate. Environmental historians, like J.R. McNeill,
often link human-environment relationships using unexpected actors like disease, natural
disasters, geography, specific plant and animal species, etc.9 Employing this framework, I argue
that the environment plays a prominent role in shaping human experience, but humans
themselves interact with each other and the environment in ways that perpetuate or exacerbate
disasters, such as hurricanes and wildfires.

7

Olmsted, Frederick L., A Journey through Texas, or, a Saddle Trip on the Southwestern Frontier (New York: Dix,
Edwards, 1857), 36
8
Melosi, Martin V. and Pratt, Joseph, Energy Metropolis: An Environmental History of Houston and the Gulf Coast,
History of the Urban Environment (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007). 21.
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McNeill, John R., Mosquito Empires : Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914, New Approaches to
the Americas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
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For Houstonians, the promise of prosperity through the development of the land was far
more important than its effects on the environment around them. Houston was notorious for its
unwelcoming terrain, yet early settlers still decided to further alter the region. Relying on cotton
as a cash crop commodity, Houston was eager to connect its cotton production with markets in
the northeast. To achieve this, the city government and commercial interests designated the
widening and deepening of existing bayous across the eastern part of the city to establish the
Houston Ship Channel. This same ship channel today handles more than 80 million tons of
shipping annually. 10 The economic gain associated with the ship channel, urbanization, and
population growth propelled the city forward while altering the region’s watershed in
unprecedented ways. What once was a city of slightly over 2,000 people would become an
energy hub of over 80,000 in just two decades. As energy use increased throughout the 1900s, so
did Houston’s population. In a relative blink of an eye, over 2.3 million people would end up in
the fourth largest city in America.11
Catastrophic floods have plagued the Texas coast since the earliest recorded settlements,
but their frequency, intensity, and impact have increased due to climate change and rapid
urbanization. This is worrying because city officials have been slow in taking note of flooding.
The earliest measures taken against deluge were in 1937, when the Harris County Flood Control
District (HCFCD) was established. 12 Up until the late ‘90s, HCFCD was successful in keeping
the city’s many bayous from inundating Downtown Houston with the help of the Addicks and
Barker reservoirs (Fig. 2). Houstonians and officials alike took little notice of flooding events
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Britannica, “Houston | Geography, History, & Points of Interest | Britannica.Com,” September 20, 2018,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Houston.
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Texas State Historical Association, “Texas Almanac: City Population History from 1850-2000,” 2018.
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Thompson, Daphne. "Houston's History of Floods." A Brief History of Weather Radar. August 30, 2017. Accessed
October 03, 2018. https://blog.weatherops.com/houstons-history-of-floods.

6

because they were generally mild. That changed in the summer of 2001, when Hurricane
Allison’s rains and winds ripped through the city, killing 23 people and damaging 70,000 homes
and more than 95,000 vehicles.13 Still, few measures had been taken against flooding other than
rebuilding structures that had been damaged by water. This is evident in the amount of money
that has been allocated towards hurricane relief and mitigation in the past. Hurricanes Rita and
Ike cost Houston less than $20 billion total where Harvey’s costs have amounted to over $70
billion plus over $30 billion for proposed projects throughout the city. This is why I feel that
Hurricane Harvey is different.
FEMA reported that over 300,000 houses were affected by Harvey’s 27 trillion gallons of
rain, and total losses across the region exceed $75 billion. 14 Surely a lot can be said about the
traumas experienced by those in the path of the hurricane, but an undeniable fact remains: not
everyone continues to be haunted by what Harvey did to the city. As I have highlighted, poor and
minority groups were and continue to be disproportionally affected by the damages caused by
Hurricane Harvey. They are the ones that continue to camp out in crowded underpasses, and they
are the ones that are most exposed to the injustices of climate change.
To summarize a few key points, I would like to point to an idea introduced by Brian
Black in his book, Petrolia: The Landscape of America’s First Oil Boom. He states that the rise
of the oil industry in Houston marked the beginning of a “culture of massive disturbance” across
the country; ultimately, these “massive [disturbances]” would render the region much more
susceptible to the effects of climate change, more specifically, hurricanes and floods.15 Several
factors have exacerbated the dangers associated with hurricanes. I argue that, when discussing
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the effects of natural disasters on communities, social and power structures should be at the
forefront of the conversation because these dynamics have shaped and continue to shape the
relationships between humans, their environment, and disasters. This thesis aims to unravel the
role of society in the ways hurricanes impact humans. Again, I quote historian J. R. McNeill
when he states that “humankind and nature make their own history together, but neither can
make it as they please.”16 With this in mind, I highlight the development of Houston, TX in
relation to minority communities and floodplains. My aspiration with this approach is to
highlight the relationships between the areas around Houston that are most susceptible to
flooding and their demographics.
I employ an interdisciplinary approach throughout this thesis to convince the reader that
human nature and society are central to discussions of disasters and climate change. Chapter 1
introduces the ecology and behavior of hurricanes, from the propagation of atmospheric waves
over the continent of Africa to the conditions that allow this initial wave to become a full-fledged
tropical cyclone. By listing the conditions necessary for a hurricane to form, I demonstrate how
the overarching effects of anthropogenic climate change can increase the severity and frequency
of hurricanes around the globe. Chapter 2 dives into the distribution of black and poor
populations across Houston. This chapter aims to introduce the systematic and institutional
powers responsible for the layout of the city, specifically highlighting Houston’s history as one
of the most segregated Jim Crow cities in history. Topics in chapter 2 include unequal housing
practices, instances of environmental racism, and the precursors leading to modern day Houston.
Chapter 3 will explore Hurricane Harvey’s impact on the local homeless population.
Furthermore, this chapter highlights the inequalities and faults associated with the aid provided

16
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by federal and state agencies by pointing out class-divides along who receives aid to rebuild after
a disaster. Finally, chapter 4 directs us to modern-day Houston and allows us to look towards the
future of the Bayou City. Local, state, and federal project proposals are described, compared, and
critiqued in this chapter.
My goal in writing this thesis is to point out the inherent inequalities associated with
hurricanes, and to a larger extent climate change. I aim to remind the reader that nature is deeply
interwoven into the fabric of human society, and though it may be that we have little control over
the immediate effects of natural disasters, we do have complete control over how we respond to
these challenges. In this way, Hurricane Harvey identified every last chink in our armor. Now, if
we fail to learn from our past mistakes, nobody else is to blame but ourselves.

9

CHAPTER 1
“That so many of us are here today is a recognition that the threat from climate
change is serious, it is urgent, and it is growing. Our generation’s response to this
challenge will be judged by history…No nation, however large or small, wealthy or
poor, can escape the impact of climate change. Rising sea levels threaten every
coastline. More powerful storms and floods threaten every continent.”
-Barack Obama, UN Climate Change Summit (2009)
Climate Change is the Culprit
With urgency, former U.S. President Barack Obama relayed his concerns about climate
change to representatives of over 90 nations gathered at the 2009 United Nations Climate
Change Summit. Mr. Obama’s words were a chilling reminder that climate change is among us.
Echoing the former president’s concerns, reputable scientific studies around the globe have
pointed towards increases in atmospheric carbon from humans altering land-use patterns and
burning fossil fuels. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released a report towards
the end of 2018 stating that humans only have until the year 2030 to curb climate change.17 If
humans decrease carbon emissions significantly, then the IPCC suggests that “our world will
suffer fewer negative impacts on intensity and frequency of extreme events.” In the most general
sense, climate change, in particular global warming, is causing a range of environmental
disasters, such as drought, sea-level rise, species extinction, and in our case, severe floods and
hurricanes. Even if one were to argue that these trends are not linked to climate change, the
increasing quantity and intensity of hurricanes across the globe every year is enough to warrant
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global
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fear. This chapter links climate change to hurricanes using nonrenewable energy as the bridge
between them. By framing climate change around energy consumption, I pinpoint how
hurricanes have increased in frequency and intensity in response to human activities.

What is a Hurricane?
Hurricanes are defined as “rotating, organized systems of clouds and thunderstorms that
originate over tropical or subtropical waters and have closed, low-level circulation”- hence their
formal name, tropical cyclones. Typically, storms, tropical depressions, tropical storms, and
hurricanes are differentiated primarily by their wind speed and wind patterns. Simply put, a
common storm graduates into a tropical storm when maximum wind speeds reach 39 mph, and
once a tropical storm’s maximum wind speeds reach 74 mph or higher, then the storm is
classified a hurricane.18
Once a storm becomes a hurricane, life-threatening injuries and damage to infrastructure
become more apparent. Therefore, a classification system was developed to discriminate
between hurricanes of different intensities. This classification system is called the SaffirSimpson scale, and it was developed in 1971 by civil engineer Herbert Saffir and meteorologist
Robert Simpson after concluding that reliable ways to categorize and describe the damage
caused by hurricanes were lacking in depth.19 Table 1 lists the different wind speeds associated
with the different Saffir-Simpson scale categories as well as the type of damage expected from
each category. Hurricane Harvey was a category 4 hurricane, but it brought with it a level of

18

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration US Department of Commerce, “What Is the Difference
between a Hurricane and a Typhoon?,” accessed November 17, 2018,
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/cyclone.html.
19
Lacovelli, Debi, “The Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Scale: An Interview with Dr. Robert Simpson,” accessed November
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damage no one could have ever anticipated. Historically, hurricanes are most common in this
region of the world between the months of June and November. This window of time is officially
called a region’s Hurricane Season.20 Hurricane researchers include members of NASA, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National Weather Service
(NWS). Aircrafts, buoys, and satellites are used by these groups to determine wind speeds, wind
patterns, and ocean and atmospheric temperatures during a hurricane. When combined, the data
gathered by these tools allow experts to classify and categorize hurricanes.21

20

NOAA, “What Is the Difference between a Hurricane and a Typhoon?”
Whetzel, Joan, “Tools Used to Measure Hurricanes | Sciencing,” March 13, 2018, https://sciencing.com/toolsused-measure-hurricanes-6862094.html.
21
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TABLE 1: HURRICANE CATEGORIES AS DESCRIBED BY THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE / NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER

Category

Sustained Winds (mph)

Types of Damage

Tropical

≤ 38

Light flooding and potential power outages

39-73

Higher potential for flooding, power outages more

Depression
Tropical
Storm
1

common, and light infrastructure damage
74-95

Roof and shingle damage, large branches will snap, and
extensive damage to power lines is likely

2

96-110

Major roof and home siding damage, uprooted trees will
block roads, and power loss is expected to last from days
to weeks

3

111-129

Removal of roof decking, blocked roads due to snapped
trees, electricity and water will be unavailable for several
days or weeks

4

130-156

Major damage or loss of roof and walls, most trees and
poles will be downed, power outage likely to last many
weeks and area may be uninhabitable

5

157 ≤

Framed homes destroyed, total roof and wall failure,
power outages, and area will be uninhabitable for weeks
or months

13

Hurricane Ecology

Hurricanes are unique to areas that have a surplus of warm coastal waters. For this
reason, hurricanes form within 25° of the Equator because this is where warm, tropical waters
are found. Furthermore, hurricane activity “generally occurs over the oceans in regions where
sea surface temperatures (SST) exceed 26° C (~78° F).”22 As expected, an increase in global
temperatures has been met with an equally significant increase in SST.
Hurricanes commonly develop catastrophically high wind speeds capable of tumbling
structures and mobilizing ocean waves (i.e. coastal storm surge). This occurs while the hurricane
simultaneously accumulates millions of gallons of water, which will be deposited onto inland
environments- both urban and natural. Hurricanes are notorious for their beautiful spiral shape,
but this shape plays a major role in the ferocity and speed of a hurricane (Fig. 2).

FIGURE 2. ON AUG. 30 AT 3:20 P.M. EDT NASA’S AQUA SATELLITE CAPTURED A VISIBLE LIGHT IMAGE OF TROPICAL STORM HARVEY MOVING
NORTH OVER TEXAS AND LOUISIANA. THE EYE OF THE STORM IS VISIBLE NEAR THE SOUTH COAST OF LOUISIANA / NASA GODDARD MODIS
RAPID RESPONSE

22
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The spiral shape of a hurricane is a visual representation of the intense wind speeds it
exhibits. A hurricane’s winds rotate and interact with the eye of the storm, which is located in the
center of the system. To achieve this spiral formation, a storm typically requires a small, closed
circulation system with higher temperatures than normal. In this case, these warmer temperatures
are usually supplied by the Gulf of Mexico’s steady supply of active thunderstorms throughout
the summer. With a considerable concentration of thunderstorms near the center, a storm can
develop into a tropical storm and ultimately, into a full-fledged hurricane (Figure 3). This
transformation relies on heat collecting in the center of the circulation. The Earth’s rotation on its
axis also interacts with these events to fully realize the spiral shape we rely on to detect
hurricanes. The accumulation of precipitation inside the growing system lowers the surface
pressure of the hurricane. This compression of the system strengthens the circulating winds while
diverting pressure throughout the hurricane. The difference in pressure throughout the system
causes wind to rush inward towards the eye of the storm, and as the storm increases in size, it
becomes easier for it to grow because the eye of the hurricane promotes evaporation and
accelerates wind speeds. Consequently, the system can only be slowed or weakened by the
sudden absence of warm water and heat.23

23
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FIGURE 3. A TRANSECT OF A HURRICANE. THE SMALL RED ARROWS SHOW WARM, MOIST AIR RISING FROM THE OCEAN’S SURFACE, AND
FORMING CLOUDS IN BANDS AROUND THE EYE OF THE STORM. THE BLUE ARROWS SHOW COOL, DRY AIR SINKING INTO THE EYE OF THE
STORM BETWEEN THE BANDS. / NASA

Political Ecology of Hurricanes

Hurricanes can be described in terms of their political ecology. Political ecology in this
sense refers to the relationship between nature and society, specifically the political and
economic aspects of society. As previously noted, even the changes we are seeing in global
temperatures can be linked to humans. Furthermore, hurricanes traverse and affect landscapes
across diverse political regions, and their very origin can be traced to locations near and far. For
instance, the formation of tropical cyclones in the Atlantic Ocean is commonly attributed to an
atmospheric wave that originates in northern Africa.24 This atmospheric wave, called an easterly
wave, travels over and across the Atlantic Ocean until sufficiently warm waters feed into it and
create hurricanes via the processes mentioned above. Since weather patterns halfway across the
world are causing devastation halfway across the world, clearly, there must be a cooperation
across parties. The following paragraphs will support this claim by listing and describing how

24
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humans across the world are at fault for altering global climate patterns. To achieve this, I will
turn back to Houston’s history as the “energy capital of America.”25
Houston, like many other cities across the United States, experienced unprecedented
growth following the discovery of oil in the late 1800s and its production as the main
nonrenewable energy source for the country by the mid-20th century.26 The environmental
degradation that would arise from the processing and manufacturing of oil and petroleum
products would surpass that of coal. Like coal and natural gas, oil is formed through a process
spanning millions of years. For oil to form, dead plants and animals are compressed and
chemically altered under many layers of sediment. Rather than being decomposed by fungi and
microbes, the biomatter is stored and compressed underground, where the carbon that would
have been released by decomposers remains locked away until humans retrieve it. Once humans
utilize fossil fuels, the carbon that should have been sequestered in underground sinks is released
into the atmosphere, which becomes saturated with much more carbon than normal.
Fossil fuels have been singled out as a leading cause of climate change because of the
heavy land-use change associated with retrieving the resource as well as the energy required to
process and refine a product that is inefficient in its energy output. The main argument against
fossil fuels is that they require too much energy to retrieve, process, and utilize as well as that
they produce dangerous quantities of carbon that are reintroduced and stored in the atmosphere.
Not only that, but the energy that is used to transport, process, and refine these fossil fuels also
release carbon in the process. Carbon is not inherently dangerous. The problem arises when too
much of it is expelled into the atmosphere over a sustained period of time as there is no feasible
way to rid the atmosphere of it. Spikes in atmospheric carbon are dangerous because carbon

25
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behaves as a greenhouse gas. That is, certain volatile compounds, such as carbon, methane, and
water vapor, interact with the sun’s rays as they penetrate Earth’s atmosphere. Rather than
allowing the sun’s infrared beams to exit the Earth’s atmosphere, these greenhouse gases absorb
and react with the beams, resulting in a considerable release of heat energy that remains trapped
in our planet. To make matters worse, increases in atmospheric carbon causes a positive
feedback from water vapor as trapped heat cause more water to evaporate into the atmosphere.
This process further traps heat as water vapor reacts with infrared light. Burning fossil fuels is
clearly shifting the balance of our atmosphere in complicated ways, but one thing remains clear:
rising global temperatures are warming global surface waters, which creates the perfect
conditions for powerful hurricanes to form. Humans have already altered the Earth’s climate in
significant ways; it is now up to us to attempt to reverse the mistakes we have made. After all,
IPCC claims we have 12 more years to do so.

18

CHAPTER 2
“The United States is no longer a biracial society of blacks and whites exclusively.
But even though the browning of the nation-rapid growth in Hispanic
populations- is changing the racial relations landscape, black-white disparities are
for the most part still the greatest of all racial challenges in the country.”
– Robert D. Bullard, The Black Metropolis in the 21st Century
Demographics and Environmental Racism
Described as an “archetypal twentieth-century city,” Houston is a “multimodal,
decentralized, and expansive metropolis” known for its energy industry and “consummate
suburban society.” Initially a heavily industrial “freeway city,” Houston has undergone many
changes as the city’s population and diversity have increased. More important still, the
unrelenting commitment to economic growth has riddled the booming metropolis with dangerous
ozone production, the presence of over a dozen Superfund sites throughout the region, water
pollution, and uncontrolled flooding events. Though these problems are surely of concern to
those living in the city, environmental issues often impact minority groups and people of color,
specifically low-income minority groups, much more frequently and to a much higher degree
compared to white and affluent people. This chapter aims to describe the distribution of black
communities across Houston as established by racist housing practices throughout the 1900s. By
exploring Houston’s history of Jim Crow laws, I map out the existing watershed onto segregated
communities throughout the city.27
Unlike many American megacities, Houston is characterized by its obvious lack of
zoning laws, which has contributed to the general chaos associated with how the city expanded.
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The lack of a zoning ordinance in Houston means that structures can be erected anywhere in the
city regardless of purpose or geography. Though generally unplanned, downtown Houston still
remains the focal point of the Gulf Coast. A general understanding of the layout of Houston will
aid when I describe the demographics of the city (Figure 4).

FIGURE 4. A MAP OF HOUSTON, TX DEPICTING THE MAJOR HIGHWAY SYSTEMS IN YELLOW. DOWNTOWN HOUSTON LIES AT THE CENTER
AND IS OUTLINED BY HIGHWAY 610. BODIES OF WATER ARE MORE PROMINENT ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE CITY, WHICH IS NEARER TO
THE COAST.

Robert D. Bullard, deemed the “Father of Environmental Justice” and revered as a
scholar of black politics in the South, states in his book entitled The Black Metropolis in the
Twenty-First Century: Race, Power, and Politics of Place that “race and class are still underlying
factors that explain the sociospatial layout of most of our cities, suburbs, and metropolitan
regions, including quality of schools, location of job centers, housing patterns, environmental
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quality, commercial and business development, access to health care, and a host of other qualityof-life indicators for African Americans.”28
Historically, a majority of black and poor populations in Houston have been located
within the confines of the “south-central and southeast portions of the city into northeast and
north-central Houston.” Black communities can now be found across the northwest and
southwestern parts of the city, but many of the impoverished neighborhoods remain unchanged
(Figure 5). African-Americans now make up one-fourth of the city of Houston and have spread
across most parts of the city, but their history remains rooted in class divides.
Segregation in Houston dates back to the birth of the energy sector at the turn of the
century. Conservative rural populations from west Texas and Louisiana migrated into Houston
with hopes of reaping the benefits of the energy sector, and they enforced the segregation and
oppression from which the city was built on. Nonetheless, by 1950 black communities
throughout Houston had become well established and were on the rise. The largest concentration
of black individuals was located in “three major segregated neighborhoods- the Fourth Ward,
Third Ward, and Fifth Ward” (Figure 5). These three wards are the focus of this section because
they have historically been inhabited by mostly African-American families, and they are
considered low-income communities. Furthermore, these areas have historically experienced
higher levels of flooding as well as unwarranted proximity to refineries, factories, and other
heavily polluting industries. In this case, racism uses a seemingly invisible hand to map out the
landscape.29
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FIGURE 5. THE 2017 U.S. CENSUS SHOWS THE DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS ACROSS THE CITY. BLACK COMMUNITIES ARE
DEPICTED BY THE RED COLOR AND ARE PREDOMINANTLY IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN PARTS OF THE CITY.

Unfair Housing Practices
Many people tend to associate racial segregation with private practices or individual
preferences. That is, it is believed that when people of color move into neighborhoods there is a
“white flight” that is followed by an even bigger influx of minority groups into the area. This
more cultural and less nuanced explanation for racial segregation is often referred to as “de facto
segregation” because it hints at its inevitability.30 This explanation, though prevalent, has been
refuted and debunked time and time again by passionate environmentalists, historians, and policy
experts. Though some elements of de facto segregation may hold truth, such as the initial
prejudice held by whites when minorities settle into new areas, the real fault lies with institutions
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that normalize the systematic oppression of blacks and poor people. Richard Rothstein, an expert
of Jim Crow laws and racial segregation in US housing practices, introduces “what courts call de
jure: segregation by law and public policy.” This more dangerous and malicious type of
segregation was possible through the “purposeful use of public housing by federal and local
governments” following the Great Depression, the development of insurance policies that
subjugated African-American applicants to unfair home prices, and by outright denying minority
groups from moving into areas that were historically white or already “integrated enough.” Not
only were people of color systematically wrangled into certain neighborhoods, they were also
forced to endure quickly deteriorating infrastructure to repel white and/or wealthier individuals.
Slightly more obvious have been the operations to locate factories, landfills and other unwanted
facilities near poor and minority neighborhoods. Furthermore, blue-collar workers have also
settled in areas surrounding these factories, which has increased the proportion of low-income
individuals in these neighborhoods. Over time, these neighborhoods would urbanize and reach a
much higher level of flood risk than before.31
A common misconception associated with de facto segregation is that black families have
been unable to move into predominantly white middle-class communities and are still unable to
do so merely because they lack the means. In this case, segregation is just another marker of their
own status. On the surface, this may seem like a valid argument, but it takes a deeper
understanding of income gaps between low and middle-income groups to fully understand how
thoroughly racism is embedded in housing segregation. Some people are able escape poverty
through strenuous work, dedication, and to some extent luck and timing, but unfortunately, this
tends to be a small percentage of low-income individuals. Though it may be easy to just blame
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someone for not working hard enough or for not wanting to better for themselves, the truth is that
predominantly black and poor neighborhoods have been molded and built over the foundations
established by class and racial divides in the twentieth century.
In Houston and around the country, black communities have historically been considered
“opportunity-poor” communities because of the fact that “businesses systematically avoid
African-American areas of all class levels and selectively target white areas for their operations.”
Furthermore, there are many recorded instances of banks giving credit extensions on unfair terms
for people living in specific geographic areas or denying mostly black communities equal access
to residential, consumer, and small business credit. What these unfair practices end up doing is
creating poor, working class, or minority neighborhoods with fewer choices and opportunities,
such as affordable housing, good-quality schools, high-paying jobs, businesses, green spaces,
parks and even hospitals and police stations.32
We then come back to the question of income gaps, and the ability of low-income
communities to pull themselves out of poverty. Given that black neighborhoods are
disproportionately less likely to have successful businesses or equal opportunities, it has been
observed that these individuals tend to have “smaller disposable incomes and fewer saving”
which keeps these families from accumulating wealth and moving into middle-class
communities in the long run.33 Banks and insurance companies are still guided by their
predecessors to this day, though perhaps in less obvious ways, and poor and minority groups
continue to have a hard time moving into lower-risk neighborhoods. Unfair housing and zoning
practices have rendered minority groups vulnerable to disasters, specifically the flooding
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associated with hurricanes. The following section will map out Houston’s most vulnerable
locations in relation to the racial and class groups inhabiting these areas.

Minorities in the Floodplains

Following Hurricane Rita, a category 5 hurricane that made landfall in Houston on
September, 2005 and caused over a hundred fatalities as well as over $18 million in damages, the
city of Houston’s Harris County Flood Control District created an online educational mapping
tool using data obtained and updated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 34
This online tool, named the Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM), can be used to locate
floodplains, which will be useful in our analysis of demographics across the city. This
relationship is clearly summarized in figure 6.
Mapped onto the Flood Education Mapping Tool are nine of the most dangerous and
most impoverished neighborhoods in Houston according to the U.S. census. The average income
across these neighborhoods ranges from $12,477 to slightly above $50,000 in the wealthier
locations, which is still $5,000 below the average income in Harris County.35 Just by looking at
average yearly income, school quality rankings, and crime rates in these locations, we see a
definite trend between demographics and flood-risk. Furthermore, the nine sites labeled in figure
6 are predominantly African-American or Latinx, except for Midtown (site 3) and Meyerland
(site 7) which are experiencing increasing gentrification. Clearly, a large portion of Houston runs
the risk of encountering floods, but historically, the wealthiest neighborhoods that are also near
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floodplains have experienced little infrastructural damage due to more sophisticated drainage
systems paid for by more abundant public tax dollars. Areas marked by the green boxes are
among the wealthiest neighborhoods in Houston, and they definitely keep themselves elevated
and distant from the 100-year floodplains, which are marked by the darker blue colors in figure
6.
3
8
F
6
G
1
2

A
C

D
5

9

B

E

4

7

FIGURE 6. POOREST NEIGHBORHOODS IN RED 1=SECOND WARD; 2=MIDTOWN; 3=NORTHLINE; 4=THIRD WARD; 5=EASTWOOD;
6=NORTHSIDE VILLAGE, 7=MEYERLAND, 8=KASHMERE GARDENS; 9=GALENA PARK.
WEALTHIEST NEIGHBORHOODS IN GREEN A= HUNTER’S CREEK VILLAGE; B=WEST UNIVERSITY PLACE: C=RIVER OAKS: D=MONTROSE:
E=BELLAIRE; F= THE HEIGHTS; G= CRESTWOOD)/ HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD EDUCATION MAPPING TOOL

Houston’s current struggle with the effects of climate change and hurricanes is deeply
embedded within the racial and class divides that have tortured the city since its establishment in
the mid-1800s. Through an exploration of racist housing practices in the growth of Houston, one
can conclude that segregation during this time served a very real purpose. The first suburb of the
city, marked by the letter F, was the Houston Heights. With seven historic districts, the Heights
was founded in 1896 by Oscar Martin Carter and Daniel Denton Cooley, members of the Omaha
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and South Texas Land Company.36 As one could have guessed, the men were drawn to this
location because it was near downtown yet had a significant rise in elevation, which would keep
both floods and mosquitoes at bay. From the very beginning of development in Houston, we see
the most appealing and safest location become inhabited by the privileged. Wanting to maintain
their properties’ value and their families safe, members of the higher class had the resources
necessary to build the city in their image. This is exactly why Houston’s Historic District
predominantly lies in The Heights, Montrose (green D), and West University Place (green B),
three of the wealthiest and most elevated neighborhoods in Houston (Fig. 6). Recognizing the
dangers of developing in low elevations, Downtown Houston stands about 50 feet above sea
level, which is only 40 feet below the highest elevation in the city.37
Diversity began to rise throughout the 1900s due to the boom in the energy sector and
the decline in cotton production due to its mechanization. Thus, older neighborhoods that were
already fully developed, such as the three mentioned above, were out of reach for incoming
minorities. Originating from the slave plantation economy, Houston has been plagued by
prejudice and racism since its infancy, and these factors remained an integral part in the growth
of Houston under Jim Crow laws in the second-half of the 20th century. I conclude that
Houston’s very first neighborhoods were opportunistically chosen by white elite in the most
elevated locations to avoid disease and property damage, and by developing these locations, they
laid the foundation for the segregation of future populations into unappealing and dangerous
floodplains.
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CHAPTER 3
“How often have I lain beneath rain on a stranger roof, thinking of
home”
-William C. Faulkner, “As I Lay Dying”
Tent-Cities in the Underpass
Clusters of homeless people have appeared throughout the City of Houston following
Hurricane Harvey. What were once uninhabited underpasses have become the living quarters for
hundreds of Houstonians. The rise in homelessness across the city is painfully evident. A simple
explanation for the rise of homelessness in Houston may be that there was absolutely nothing
anybody could do about the torrential rainfall once Harvey made landfall. In reality, the Gulf
Coast is no stranger to hurricanes, and the fact that the region was built on flat prairies, marshes,
and coastal ecosystems does not help. Still, ecology and geography alone are not to blame for the
sudden spike in the number of displaced Houstonians. In this chapter, I argue that government
agencies failed to help citizens rebuild after Harvey in part because the magnitude of the
devastation was unprecedented but also because flood insurance via the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) and aid from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
were unavailable or insufficient for low-income communities.38
Hurricane Harvey rattled neighborhoods across Houston that had never experienced
flooding before. In totality, Harvey unleashed an astounding 50 inches of rain in a span of just
three days—slightly above the annual average rainfall in the region. Houston was not ready to
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withstand the devastation, but more importantly, homeowners were far less prepared to rebuild
afterwards. Simply put, Hurricane Harvey taught Houstonians just how complicated the effects
of natural disasters can be on a heavily urbanized metropolitan city like Houston.
When discussing the nature of aid, specifically for a flood event, it is important to take
into consideration the following potential sources of aid: private insurance companies, the
National Flood Insurance Program (NIFP), the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), and small-scale local and federal aid. Of these sources, private flood insurance policies
are largely employed by large-scale companies because of how expensive, yet expansive, the
coverage is. In a similar note, federal aid has been distributed intermittently as problems arise in
the region, and the local government has been able to relocate over a hundred individuals so far,
yet nearly 154,000 homes were flooded by Hurricane Harvey.39 For these reasons, we must turn
towards the NIFP and FEMA because they played a much larger role in the reconstruction of
Houston.

NIFP and FEMA

First and foremost, there is a sharp contrast between the aid provided by NIFP versus
FEMA. Flood insurance through NIFP is a reliable, and preventative, resource to fall back on
when things go awry where FEMA provides immediate aid to those in desperate need of it. In
fact, following Hurricane Harvey, FEMA announced that it wanted to double the amount of
insured structures in the U.S. by advertising insurance policies in high-risk flood zones. By
insuring the most at-risk communities, FEMA can maximize its very limited resources for those
who truly need it (i.e. people who cannot afford flood insurance). Furthermore, it benefits

39

Despart, Zach. "Flood Insurance Paid Homeowners $100,000 More than FEMA...

29

homeowners to purchase flood insurance from NIFP because it amounts to, on average, $100,000
more than FEMA is able to provide to any given individual.40 To become insured, individuals
pay a monthly premium to NIFP like they would to any other insurance company, and this
monthly payment amounts to around $500 a year (this value can rise to more than $2,000 for
homes in floodplains).41 Right away, class division dictate who will be able to rebuild and who
will have to take their chances with the couple thousand dollars FEMA is able to provide. Recall
from the previous chapter that the poorest neighborhoods in Houston were also among the
closest to floodplains. How can they be expected to pay for flood insurance?
Though low-income groups may be unable to afford flood insurance, a majority of the
individuals that live in floodplains and that can afford flood insurance still lack insurance.
Consequently, over 80% of the affected homes in Houston were not insured. This reality rises
primarily because insurance policies are a luxury that many cannot afford, but also because
FEMA and the federal government have misinformed people of the nature of floods in a unique
city like Houston.42 Still, NIFP has its own issues since it has gone over $25 billion in debt ($5
billion short of their limit) following Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, so even this source of aid is
gradually shrinking.43
Blaming individual homeowners for not investing in flood insurance is a fruitless
endeavor because a) insurance policies can amount to over $2,000 a year and b) FEMA and the
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federal government have repeatedly failed to accurately classify flood risk zones throughout the
Greater Houston area, which has thwarted wealthier homeowners from confidently investing in
flood insurance. Essentially, the federal government, and to some extent local and state officials,
have neglected conducting meaningful research around the quickly developing city landscape
and its effects on existing watersheds and floodplains. This is especially evident in the treatment
of federally-backed housing units in high-risk flood zones because they are required by law to
have an active flood insurance policy, yet many were not actually insured.44 Locations deemed
“Special Flood Hazard Areas” (SFHAs) by FEMA are required to have flood insurance, but
these SFHAs became virtually indiscriminate once a majority of the city was underwater.
Evidently, the politics surrounding financial aid during disasters is complex, but this scenario
serves as a reminder of just how inherently unequal government institutions can be.

Homelessness by the Numbers

When disaster strikes, there seems to be an air of heroism in the city, which translates
into individuals offering their own resources to help people out of dangerous situations (Figure
7). Images of burly men carrying frail seniors out of their flooded homes became commonplace
on TV and newspapers. Furthermore, people tried to help each other in any way that they could,
and this was especially apparent on social media. During Hurricane Harvey, the mornings
following a heavy rainfall would be flooded with pleas for help locating friends and loved ones.
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Images of individuals that had gone missing during the night would dominate my Facebook feed.
A sense of urgency always lingered in the air, and we all desperately wanted to help.

FIGURE 7. AN EXAMPLE OF THE WATER RESCUES THAT WERE ONGOING DURING HARVEY IN HOUSTON ON 27 AUGUST 2017 / DAVID J
PHILLIPS (ASSOCIATED PRESS)

Though this horrific event did bring out the good in people, it cannot go unnoticed that
our government left us to fend for ourselves. Aid did end up arriving, but why were families like
mine left without access to food for days at a time? Why have some families returned home but
other are still forced to live in shelters and underpasses? Why are citizens expected to carry the
slack for the government, which should be maintaining and consolidating infrastructure? In this
section, I aim to uncover just how bad the homeless situation has gotten in Houston a little over a
year after Harvey made landfall in August 2017.
The Coalition for the Homeless has played a pivotal role in tracking homelessness across
several counties in the region with a particular focus on those that became homeless because of
Hurricane Harvey. As defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
32

an individual is considered homeless if they are “staying in an emergency shelter, transitional
housing, a safe haven with beds specifically for homeless persons” or living on the street
unsheltered. Using this definition, the Coalition for the Homeless concluded that Houston’s
Harris County had 91% of the total number of recorded homeless people in the region.
Furthermore, the region, predominantly Harris County, experienced an increase in homeless
populations from 3,412 to 3,866 with a majority of the increase being attributed to a spike in
unsheltered individuals (1,084 unsheltered in 2017 to 1,540 unsheltered in 2018). Of the 3,866
homeless people recorded in this survey, 18 percent of them claimed to have become homeless
because of Hurricane Harvey.45 This is approximately 696 of the 3,866 people recorded, and of
these 696 displaced individuals, 456 are entirely unsheltered meaning that over 65 percent of the
individuals that lost their homes to Harvey were unable to secure shelter or enough aid to return
home. This comes as no surprise since FEMA ended up accommodating over 42,000 people in
temporary shelters. Furthermore, in a period of just 30 days, approximately 270,916 households
were granted $571.8 million in FEMA aid (about $2,000 per household) for temporary housing,
basic repairs, and other essential needs.46 Temporary housing was provided after Harvey for a
maximum period of one month, and repairs were expected to average upwards of $15,000 per
household. In a city where the median price of a home is $289,950, $2,000 could either shelter
and feed a family for a few months or be used to partially clean up a flooded home.
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FIGURE 8. DATA COLLECTED IN HARRIS, FORT BEND, AND MONTGOMERY COUNTIES SHOW AN INCREASE IN HOMELESS INDIVIDUALS FROM
2017 TO 2018/ THE COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS

Clearly, the institutions put in place to aid during times of extreme emergencies are
lacking in direction, capacity, and efficiency, but there is also something to be said about the lack
of affordable (and fortified) housing in Houston. Low-income groups, who now make up a
majority of the unsheltered homeless individuals, cannot be expected to reenter the housing
market when an increase of 4.1 percent has been observed in the average rent for single-family
homes and an increase of 2.2 percent has been observed for the average rent for townhomes and
condominiums following Hurricane Harvey.47 Low-income groups would most likely avoid both
single-family homes and townhomes anyway since they still cost about $1,500 per month. The
main problem now lies with the fact that Houston has an average of 18 homes available for every
100 extremely low-income renter households. This means that if every available low-income
house in the region were rented out to the current population of homeless people in Houston,
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there would still be over 3,100 people living in shelters and on the streets. This is clearly a
problem.
Hurricane Harvey exacerbated the homelessness problem that Houston already had
before the storm, but this sudden rise in homelessness has made several things abundantly clear.
First, Houston’s long history of unregulated sprawl has led to a general disregard for the state of
the environment and the effects of urbanization on biotic and abiotic factors. Second,
underfunded federal institutions and agencies have demonstrated that they are not fully capable
of supporting a city the size of Houston during and after a disaster. Third, low-income
communities with affordable housing tend to be closest to floodplains while still having the least
structural fortification to withstand flooding events. Combined, these three points underscore the
main argument of this thesis: that low-income communities have been systematically forced to
endure disproportionately more environmental problems compared to their wealthy and white
counterparts. Having discussed the faults of our federal and local governments during and
directly after Harvey, the problematic history of Houston development under Jim Crow laws, and
the role of humans in propagating stronger and stronger hurricanes via climate change, I will
now explore the future of the Texas Gulf Coast, for these next few years are vital for the future
of the region and its people.
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CHAPTER 4
“A man should never be ashamed to own he has been in the wrong,
which is but saying that he is wiser today than he was yesterday.”
-Alexander Pope on the value of Learning
Looking Forward
Countless hurricanes have ravaged Texas’s Gulf Coast, and, every single event has had a
lasting impact on at least a proportion of the population. Still, government institutions at the
local, state, and federal level have neglected the safety of large metropolitan cities like Houston
for the sake of growth and development. Rather than investing in flood and hurricane research,
the federal government has recently enacted budget cuts for such government agencies as the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Federal Emergency Response Agency
(FEMA), which are solely dedicated to the management, conservation, and preservation of
nationwide environments, including the task of protecting and aiding communities during natural
disasters.48 Budget cuts and mismanagement have become apparent in how the federal
government is responding to the needs of the city and its inhabitants.
Prior to Hurricane Harvey and to some extent even after, Houstonians have had a limited
understanding of the environment directly around them. Having attended public school in Texas
for the entirety of my childhood, matters of pollution and environmental degradation were not
discussed, and when they were, the topics rarely covered ecosystems in Texas. The general
patchiness in my understanding of the natural world became that much more evident after I
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began my pursuit of an undergraduate degree in Environmental Analysis. As Melosi and Pratt
point out in their book, Energy Metropolis, up until very recently, most members of society,
whether rich or poor, white or minority groups, have admired the opportunities and the
unfettered growth that Houston has provided them and their families under the heavily polluting
industries of oil and natural gas.49 In fact, these industries have created over two dozen
Superfund sites across the Gulf Coast region.50 Eight of these heavily contaminated sites lie in
the center of Houston, within the circumference of Interstate 610. It would not be until the
summer of 2018 that I myself would discover these hidden truths about my hometown.
During the summer of 2018, I became a member of Texas Campaign for the Environment
(TCE), a non-profit organization that campaigns year-round in Houston and Dallas with hopes of
mobilizing constituents to reach out to their representatives to tackle environmental problems.
The 2018 TCE campaign aimed to get more Superfund sites cleaned up following a successful
2017 campaign that convinced former EPA administrator Scott Pruitt to cleanup the San Jacinto
Tar Pits. What at first seemed like a huge victory quickly diminished since Texas’s lax
environmental regulations meant that the area would be considered clean even when toxins and
contaminants remained present at the site. Still, the passionate work that environmental groups,
like TCE perform for their communities is invaluable, and the fear that Hurricane Harvey
brought to Texas has surely helped in propelling community members towards change at the
local and state level. In fact, pressure at the local and state level has compelled public and private
research universities, like the University of Houston, Rice University, and even distant schools in
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North Texas and Louisiana, to develop plans for how to protect the city against hurricanes and
floods.51 Sixteen hurricanes of category 3 or higher have made landfall in the Texas Gulf Coast
since the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, which was the deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history
with fatalities between 6,000 and 8,000 individuals (Figures 9 & 10).52 Several plans have
recently been brought forth that aim to curb the effects of hurricanes and flooding on the city of
Houston. This chapter analyzes and criticized several projects proposed by state and federal
officials with aims of consolidating the City of Houston and the Texas Gulf Coast.

FIGURE 9. THIS IMAGE DEPICTS A GROUP OF CHILDREN POSING IN FRONT OF A HOUSE THAT WAS STRIPPED FROM ITS FOUNDATION AND
SHIFTED BY THE HURRICANE'S WINDS. / LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
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FIGURE 10. THIS IMAGE SHOWS THE DEVASTATION CAUSED BY THE GALVESTON HURRICANE OF 1900. THE LANDSCAPE IS COMPLETELY
DROWNED BY TUMBLED STRUCTURES AND HOMES. / LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

The ongoing research conducted by Rice University has been focusing on the cooperation
between local communities and government officials in planning flood mitigation strategies. The
rationale here lies in that local community members are better versed in their own communities,
so their opinions and experiences should carry weight in these discussions. Rice University has
tackled this issue using a mixture of scientific research as well as a nuanced understanding of
policies and traditional knowledge of the environment. Students at Rice identified several key
points for the successful and efficient implementation of natural disaster mitigation strategies in
Houston. First and foremost, data surrounding the geography of the Gulf Coast, including
floodplains and active watersheds, as well as the locations that run the highest risk of flooding
should be actively and reliably collected as well as effectively and accessibly presented to the
general public. Along these lines, local and outside expertise should be employed to increase the
effectiveness of local action as well as to determine the most vulnerable populations and how to
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best aid them before, during, and after a natural disaster. Finally, the researchers at Rice
recognize the limitations associated with aid and research at the federal level--i.e. budget cuts,
biases, ulterior motives, etc., so they suggest coming up with innovative ways to pay the
individuals involved in these large-scale projects before finally planning and executing them.
This study provided a general overview from which to draw inspiration for future planning. The
authors inform us that the Harris County Flood Control District has been cooperating with
researchers across Texas, university researchers, city officials, and Harris County constituents.53
The passionate work and cooperation between these groups are what made the following
proposals possible.
Immediately following Hurricane Harvey, several Houston area groups collaborated and
drafted some preliminary demands based on the city’s needs. Over the course of two months, the
U.S. House of Representatives would pass several Hurricane Harvey relief packages.54 Congress
would end up allocating over $50 billion in Harvey relief by the end of 2017. Though
considerate, most of this funding would end up going towards FEMA relief efforts rather than
future mitigation efforts.
A sense of urgency has lingered following Harvey as Houstonians wonder how the city is
going to move forward. Fortunately, diverse groups have banded together with the goal of
drafting robust and logical projects aimed at mitigating the effects of future hurricanes on the
region. The varying backgrounds and experiences of these individuals has naturally led to
diverse project proposals with different goals, but some key themes are reiterated in these
proposals. In this section I will describe some notable project proposals as well as their
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shortcomings. This will be done by looking at the project proposals in chronological order
following Harvey.

Rebuild Texas and a Comprehensive Flood Protection Plan for a Better Houston
As I mentioned before, congress has allocated funds towards the Texas Gulf Coast
following Hurricane Harvey, but most of this money went towards FEMA relief efforts and to
paying off “debts accumulated by the National Flood Insurance Program.” In an effort to place
more emphasis on rebuilding and consolidating existing bodies of water, Governor Greg Abbot
proposed the Rebuild Texas plan, which is composed of several different projects totaling $61.8
billion in additional funding. Gov. Abbot’s projects place an emphasis on consolidating Addicks
and Barker Reservoirs, which only keep Greater Houston from experiencing catastrophic floods
from the upper-west side, but this project has been heavily criticized for neglecting the safety of
the rest of Harris County. Nonetheless, Gov. Abbot adopts a well-rounded approach to his
project proposal and accepts the help of more educated individuals to avoid mistakes.55
The Rebuild Texas plan aims to rebuild the Gulf Coast by following three main steps.
First, to facilitate and expedite the general rebuilding of any and all affected areas, “assistance
[centers]” with experts on “federal and state law, federal disaster rules, state rules, government
procurement, and large-scale construction issues” will guide local officials as well as community
members when tackling preliminary issues. Second, assistance centers will serve as continuous
links between the affected communities, state officials, and federal programs. Finally, each group
and region will report back to the Governor so that he can ensure consistent rebuilding efforts
across the region. The Rebuild Texas plan ultimately calls for a timely response to local needs

55

Arrajj, Shawn. "Houston Area Groups Propose Plan…”

41

based on individual assessments, and the plan relies on the assumption that communities should
be built better and stronger than before.56
Apart from the fortification of communities based on local needs, which makes up a large
part of Rebuild Texas, Abbot’s plan also places an emphasis on the consolidation of existing
reservoirs and the construction of a third reservoir in the Cypress Creek watershed. This
additional reservoir would presumably take pressure off the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs
during floods. Though a pivotal step in keeping west Houston dry, this portion of Abbot’s plan
has been criticized for not taking into consideration issues like water flow and speed when
talking about flooding trends. A strong supporter of Governor Abbot’s plan has been the
president of the West Houston Association, Augustus Campbell.57 Rather than going against the
governor’s plan, Campbell has been fighting for the expansion of Rebuild Texas to what he calls
A Comprehensive Flood Protection Plan for a Better Houston (CFPPBH). Both plans call for the
immediate research and development of existing reservoirs as well as the construction of a third,
new reservoir in Cypress Creek. Both plans also place an emphasis on home buyouts to remove
people from harms way as well as to empty out spaces to develop and build as needed.
CFPPBH mainly differs in that it also demands the upkeep of existing bayou conveyance
projects. Campbell claims that flooding events in Houston have become commonplace because
of slow conveyance across bodies of water. By facilitating the flow of water out of bayous,
Campbell argues that approximately 12 inches of rainfall can be expelled from the Greater
Houston area in less than 24 hours. Campbell cites the Sims Bayou project as justification for
increasing bayou conveyance since the 2015 project essentially kept all the homes along the
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Sims Bayou from flooding during Harvey.58 An overview of Campbell’s Comprehensive Flood
Protection Plan for a Better Houston, which encapsulates many of the projects proposed in
Rebuild Texas, is shown in figure 11. The graphic summarizes the points made above while also
providing a break down of costs and expenditures. Though broad in scope, these two plans are
similar in that they utilize local knowledge and infrastructure to maximize the aid that
communities receive.
Initially, many of these proposals may have seemed overly ambitious since hundreds of
millions of dollars are expected to go into each project, but Hurricane Harvey clearly had a deeprooted effect on the not-so-environmentally friendly state of Texas because suddenly, money was
no longer a concern. Almost a year after Hurricane Harvey made landfall, an overwhelming 80
percent of voters in Harris County approved the $2.5 billion Harris County Proposition A flood
bond, which would raise taxes enough to pay for either Governor Abbot or Augustus Campbell’s
plan.59 These projects have the unwavering support of citizens, policy-makers, government
officials, and scientists alike, but how much longer will we keep waiting on the slow-moving
hand of the federal government? I say this primarily because citizens and local officials have
demonstrated an eagerness to move forward with these projects while the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers seem to only be getting in the way.
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FIGURE 11. THIS GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATES THE COMPREHENSIVE FLOOD PROTECTION PLAN FOR A BETTER HOUSTON PROPOSED BY CAMPBELL.
THE AREAS MARKED A, B, C, AND D REPRESENT RESEVOIRS THAT REQUIRE $3 BILLION IN FUNDING TO RESTORE. THE LIGHT-BLUE BOX
REPRESENTS A LOCATION THAT SHOULD BE STRATETIGALLY BOUGHTOUT FOR $8.5 BILLION. THE RED LINES THROUGHOUT THE GRAPHIC
REPRESENT MAJOR BAYOUS THAT SHOULD BE WORKED ON TO IMPROVE CONVEYANCE FOR $20 BILLION. THE PURPLE CIRCLE IN THE TOP
LEFT REPRESENTS THE LITTLE CYPRESS RESEVOIR, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE $0.3 BILLION TO BUILD. / WEST HOUSTON ASSOCIATION

The “Ike Dyke” Proposal
The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) is a U.S. federal agency under the
Department of Defense that tackles engineering projects in a wide range of public works, such as
dam, canal and flood management. USACE has previously come under fire for neglecting
environmental degradation and privileging economic and political agendas when making
decisions (i.e. most recently the Dakota Access pipeline). Nonetheless, the work performed by
USACE is integral in shaping, approving, and carrying out projects across the region and across
the country. Their cooperation is needed if we ever hope to move forward with large-scale
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infrastructure rehabilitation. Unfortunately, the Gulf Coast is not the only location getting
pummeled by natural disasters nor is it the only place in need of research and aid. For this
reason, USACE does not expect to publish a detailed proposal of the “Ike Dyke” project until the
year 2021, and even then, policy experts expect another 20 to 30 years before the proposal
becomes a reality. To further complicate the matter, USACE is proposing a project that solely
aims to limit the intensity of storm surges during hurricanes rather than keeping inland
communities from experiencing freshwater floods. This shows a clear lack of understanding
given that all 68 deaths in Texas during Hurricane Harvey were due to local flooding events
rather than storm surges.60 Still, USACE tackles some of the issues associated with hurricanes at
the coastal front rather than within the confines of the city. The proposed project, entitled “Ike
Dyke,” named after the infamous Hurricane Ike, is grand in scale, cost, and resources, but the
project may indeed serve as a precautionary measure. Even though the project may not become a
reality any time soon, there is value in analyzing its faults and potential benefits. Perhaps the
combined efforts of inland and coastal project will prove far more effective than pursuing just
one of the two.
Compared to Rebuild Texas and CFPPBH, state officials and federal officials, under the
guidance of USACE, proposed 62 miles of “barrier system made up of floodwalls, floodgates
and seawall improvements” along Galveston Island (Figure 12). Rather than fortifying and
rebuilding inland reservoirs and floodplains, USACE has mainly focused on keeping the “largest
coastal petrochemical complex in the country” from harm’s way. The fact that $31 billion is
needed to complete the “Ike Dyke” project means that the project has also drawn attention and
criticism from different research groups. Jim Blackburn, an active Rice University professor in
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the reconstruction of Houston, has criticized USACE for basing the “Ike Dyke” off of data
collected during Hurricane Ike, which was a category 4 tropical cyclone that hit the Gulf Coast in
2008.61 This is a major flaw in the project proposal’s logic because it essentially creates a
structure that can sustain the effects of a hurricane that is in every way incomparable to a
hurricane like Harvey. Though any protection from storm surges is beneficial, USACE should
include the most recent and relevant data to ensure a project that will withstand not one or two
storms, but the collective force of dozens of powerful hurricanes throughout our lifetimes. 2017
alone witnessed Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, which were all stronger than Hurricane
Ike, so more thought is obviously required if we ever hope to see the “Ike Dyke” project realized
in a practical manner. As Blackburn stated, “if all of our eggs are in a $30 billion federal
appropriation, that just sounds too risky to me.”
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FIGURE 12. THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS HAVE PROPOSED A DIKE (IN RED) RUNNING ALONG THE ISLAND CITY OF GALVESTON WITH
A FLOOD GATE, MARKED BY GREEN, TO COMBAT STORM SURGES. / TODD WISEMAN

Reiterated throughout this chapter has been the importance of localized efforts in drafting
plans and proposals for how to rebuild the city. Local efforts, such as citizen mobilization,
university and college research, non-profit work, and the involvement of local officials, have
focused on rebuilding and consolidating inland communities because these are the places facing
the most infrastructure damage, contamination, and loss of life during hurricanes. Furthermore,
the individuals experiencing these problems first-hand are much more knowledgeable on what
their immediate needs are. As expected, the USACE prioritizes the protection of the immediate
coast because the country as a whole depends on the refineries and factories located in this
region. The allocation of aid and the actual projects that will be implemented depend on the
funding available and the priorities of the groups providing the resources. At the end of the day,
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groups are still mobilizing and rallying support well over a year after Hurricane Harvey
occurred, and who knows how much longer it will take for these projects to finally initiate. There
are still gaps in our knowledge, but we cannot risk waiting for the next big hurricane to hit before
we finally act.
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CONCLUSION
Hurricane Harvey will forever remain ingrained in my memory. Not because it was the
most devastating hurricane to ever hit the Texas Gulf Coast but because it pressured an entire
region to take the threats of climate change and disasters more seriously. A majority of
Houstonians were once unaffected by floods and storms altogether, but this has quickly changed.
Floods have become more frequent in Houston in the last two decades as the city has welcomed
nearly half a million more people. As the city has grown and developed, concrete surfaces have
altered the region’s watersheds by increasing the amount of rain water that enters floodplains.
Furthermore, the industrialization of the economy and subsequent deforestation of the coast has
weakened sand banks and exacerbated the effects of hurricanes. If Houston continues to grow,
then more dangers are expected to surface as more people are placed in the trajectory of future
hurricanes.
Throughout this thesis, I have laid out several factors that contribute to the overall
intensity of hurricanes within a region. First, I linked human consumption of nonrenewable
resources to climate change. This was done to remind the reader of the complex ways that
humans have interacted with their environments and to show how the environment has in turn
responded to these interactions. My main purpose in providing a scientific background on
hurricane formation and hurricane ecology was to convince the reader that humans have played
an active role in how powerful hurricanes have become under global warming. I described the
transition of Houston from a plantation-based economy to one heavily reliant on oil to
contextualize the history of African-American settlement throughout the city. I argue that white
settlers chose to create suburbs in higher elevations, such as the Houston Heights, Montrose, and
West University Place, because they were distant and elevated from floodplains. In settling these
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areas, white settlers ensured that poor and black folk would be unable to afford and inhabit these
locations, which was evident in the unfair housing practices described in chapter 2. Chapter 2
framed the discussion of disasters around class and race as it showed that the poorest
neighborhoods in Houston were located directly on floodplains where the wealthiest
neighborhoods were located throughout west-central Houston, which is the least affected by
floodplains. Chapter 3 furthered this discussion by pinpointing the flaws associated with state
and federal aid following a disaster. Essentially, the aid provided by FEMA after any disaster is
heavily limited by the sheer number of people that require it. To make matters worse, private
insurance companies and the National Flood Insurance Program charge premiums that are simply
out of reach for low-income households, which also have the highest flood risks. Furthermore, I
condemn Houston’s lack of affordable housing as being one of the main reasons behind the
sudden spike in homelessness across the city. I conclude by looking towards local, state, and
federal officials as they draft and propose flood mitigation projects. Through my analysis of
three separate proposals, I conclude that they each have potential to limit the intensity and
frequency of flooding, but they still require much more thought before being realized.
Ultimately, disasters like Hurricane Harvey are complex phenomena that reverberate
throughout an entire region. They are inherently complicated, and they increasingly seem to
behave in ways we have never seen before. This is where its worth noting that the world we live
in now is not the same world that the generations before us experienced. Environmental
degradation has only become more and more apparent, and every day, we seem to be nearing a
definitive crash in our society. If anything, I hope this thesis illuminates the discrepancies
between those causing environmental degradation and those directly facing it. It may be true that
climate change is indiscriminate and all-encompassing, but to say that we all suffer equally when
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disasters strike is false. Only by acknowledging these inequalities can we truly be of service to
the affected communities. If nothing else, Hurricane Harvey showed us just how unnatural these
disasters can truly be.
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